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OHIO V. CLARK: TESTIMONIAL 
STATEMENTS UNDER THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
MESHA SLOSS* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him.”1 The application of this 
guarantee, known as the Confrontation Clause, underwent a massive 
judicial overhaul in Crawford v. Washington.2  There, the United States 
Supreme Court changed the standard under which courts evaluate the 
admissibility of out-of-court statements when the declarant is not 
present for cross-examination at trial.3 A number of definitional issues 
under the new standard were left unresolved by Crawford.4 
The prior standard, as expounded by the Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 
permitted admission of statements from a witness who has been 
shown to be unavailable so long as the statements bore “adequate 
indicia of reliability.”5 In application, this standard required the out-
of-court statement be either within a “firmly rooted hearsay 
exception” or contain “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”6 
With its focus on reliability, the Roberts test placed great weight on 
the judicial evaluation of a statement’s trustworthiness, leading to 
great unpredictability in its application.7 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2016. Special thanks to Professor 
Donald Beskind for his guidance. 
 1.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 2.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (overruling the standard from Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).  
 3.  Id.  
 4.  JESSICA SMITH, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ANALYSIS: 
CRAWFORD, DAVIS, AND MELENDEZ-DIAZ 3 (University of North Carolina School of 
Government Administration of Justice Bulletin, April 2010). 
 5.  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 6.  Id. at 66.  
 7.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63; Jerome C. Latimer, Confrontation After Crawford: The 
Decision’s Impact on How Hearsay is Analyzed Under the Confrontation Clause, 36 SETON 
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In Crawford, the Court overruled Roberts, believing it violated the 
historical principles embodied in the Confrontation Clause.8 Under 
the new, stricter standard of Crawford, courts now focus on the 
testimonial nature of a statement rather than its reliability.9 The Court 
never fully defined “testimonial,” however, leaving litigants to piece 
together a working definition from dicta and subsequent holdings.10  
In Ohio v. Clark, the question before the court is whether a child’s 
statements to a mandatory reporter identifying his abuser are 
“testimonial” for Confrontation Clause purposes.11 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In 2010, Darius “Dee” Clark was living in Cleveland with his 
girlfriend and her two young children.12 Her son, L.P., was three years 
old at the time and her daughter, A.T., was one.13 When Clark’s 
girlfriend would travel out of state for work, Clark would watch her 
children.14 On multiple occasions in early 2010, family members and 
the children’s mother herself suspected Clark of injuring the children 
while they were in his care.15 
During this time, L.P. began attending William Patrick Day Head 
Start Center.16 According to L.P.’s teachers, on March 16, 2010, L.P. 
looked fine and had no marks on his face while at school.17 That 
evening, his mother left for a trip to Washington, leaving her children 
with Clark.18 
 
 
 
 
HALL L. REV. 372, 415–16 (2006).  
 8.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.  
 9.  SMITH, supra note 4, at 4.  
 10.  Id. at 8; See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to 
spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 
U.S. 305 (deciding whether lab reports submitted without the testimony of the analyst who 
performed them were testimonial under the Confrontation Clause).  
 11.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Ohio v. Clark, No. 13-1352 (U.S. May 8, 2014).  
 12.  Brief of Petitioner at 2, Ohio v. Clark, No. 13-1352 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2014) [hereinafter 
Brief of Petitioner].  
 13.  Id.   
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id. at 2–3. 
 16.  Id. at 3.  
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id.  
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The next day at lunchtime, the teaching assistant for L.P.’s class 
noticed that he refused to eat and was quieter than usual.19 She also 
noticed his eye was “bloodshot” or “bloodstained.”20 When she asked 
L.P. what happened, the child, though initially unresponsive, 
eventually told her that he fell.21 Although the teaching assistant did 
not make much of the encounter in the lunchroom, in the better 
lighting of the classroom she noticed red marks and welts across L.P.’s 
face.22 She alerted the lead teacher and both asked L.P. again what had 
happened and who had caused his injuries.23 L.P. “said something like, 
Dee, Dee,” though the teachers did not know who that was.24 Thinking 
another child might have been the source of the injury, they asked 
whether Dee was “big or little.” L.P. responded “Dee is big.”25 
The teachers took L.P. to their supervisor, who lifted L.P.’s shirt 
and discovered more injuries.26 The supervisor then had the assistant  
make out a report of child abuse to the Cuyahoga County 
Department of Children and Family Services.27 A social worker 
responded to the daycare that same day.28 Little spoke with L.P., who 
initially told him he had fallen, but later stated that Dee had caused 
his bruises.29 When Dee Clark picked up L.P. that day, he first claimed 
to know nothing about L.P.’s injuries.30 He then stated he had spanked 
L.P. a week prior and that L.P.’s injuries were “from playing outside 
because he lives in the projects.”31 Clark also claimed not to know 
anyone named Dee.32 Little told Clark that he would need further 
information from him but Clark said he did not have time and left 
with L.P.33 
 
 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 3–4.  
 24.  Id. at 4. 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id.; OHIO REV. COD. ANN. § 2151.421(A)(1)(a) (West 2015) (requiring that a teacher 
file a report of child abuse to the Department of Children and Family Services if abuse is 
suspected).  
 28.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 2. 
 29.  Id. at 4.   
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id.  
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Little followed up that day by leaving information at L.P.’s known 
residence for the family to contact him.34 Another social worker called 
L.P.’s mother the next morning, March 18.35 Still unable to find Clark 
or the children, she contacted other family members and finally 
located the children at Clark’s mother’s home.36 In addition to L.P.’s 
injuries, his little sister had two black eyes, a large burn on her cheek, 
a very swollen hand, and two ponytails that appeared to have been 
ripped out at the root.37 The social worker immediately called 911 and 
contacted a child abuse detective.38 The children were treated at a 
hospital emergency room where their injuries were documented.39 
Doctors estimated the injuries to both children had been sustained 
between February 28 and March 18, 2010.40 The children were placed 
in the care of relatives.41 L.P. later repeated to both his great aunt and 
grandmother that “Dee” was the cause of his injuries.42 Dee Clark was 
later arrested and charged with five counts of felonious assault, two 
counts of endangering children and two counts of domestic violence.43 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Before trial, L.P. was deemed incompetent to testify due to his 
age.44 Clark moved the trial court to exclude testimony about L.P’s 
out-of-court statements identifying “Dee,” arguing that these 
statements were testimonial under Crawford v. Washington and 
violated the Confrontation Clause.45 The prosecution argued that the 
statements were non-testimonial and admissible under Ohio Rule of 
Evidence 807, which allows reliable statements from children in abuse 
cases.46 The court denied Clark’s motion on the basis that L.P.’s 
statements were non-testimonial and satisfied Ohio Rule of Evidence 
807.47 The court allowed testimony identifying “Dee” as the abuser 
from L.P.’s teachers, the involved social workers, and his great aunt 
 
 34.  Id. at 5. 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Ohio v. Clark, No. 96207, 2011 WL 6780456 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2011). 
 41.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 6.   
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id. at 6–7; Ohio Evid. R. 807 (West 2015).  
 46.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 6–7. 
 47.  Id. at 7. 
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and grandmother.48 Clark was found guilty on all counts except one 
and was sentenced to twenty-eight years imprisonment.49 
Clark appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals for Ohio, 
which reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that all available 
testimony of L.P.’s statements identifying “Dee” were inadmissible.50 
The court found that, under the primary-purpose test of Crawford, 
L.P.’s statements to social workers were testimonial and, therefore, 
should not have been admitted at trial.51 In making this decision, the 
court reasoned that the social workers were “part of the preliminary 
investigation to aid law enforcement” and that L.P.’s statements were 
not “made in the midst of a police emergency” or for “medical 
treatment or diagnosis.”52 The court also found L.P.’s statements to his 
teachers to be testimonial because “the primary purpose of [the 
teachers’] questioning L.P. was to report potential child abuse to law 
enforcement.”53 Finally, the court concluded that L.P.’s statements to 
his family about his abuser’s identity were inadmissible under Ohio 
rules of evidence because they lacked the requisite guarantees of 
trustworthiness.54 
The State appealed the appellate court’s finding that L.P.’s 
statements to his teachers were testimonial.55 In a 4-3 decision, the 
Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision.56 The 
court first found that L.P.’s teachers were state agents for law 
enforcement purposes when they questioned him.57 This finding was 
based on the duty imposed on all school employees by Ohio Revised 
Code Section 2151.421 to report any actual or suspected child abuse 
or neglect.58 Although the court found the core purpose of this 
reporting mandate was to protect abused and mistreated children,59 
legislators were also concerned with identifying and punishing those 
who abused them.60 The court finally applied the primary-purpose test 
 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id.  
 52.  Id.   
 53.  Id.  
 54.  Id. at 8. 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id.  
 57.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 8.    
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. at 8–9. 
 60.  Id. at 9.  
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and determined that L.P.’s statements to his teachers were testimonial, 
finding that there was no ongoing emergency when L.P. made the 
statements nor did he need emergency medical care.61 Accordingly, 
the primary purpose of the teachers’ inquiries of L.P. was to fulfill 
their duty to report abuse.62 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a 
criminal defendant “the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”63 Per the Fourteenth Amendment, this clause is binding 
on the states.64 In Crawford v. Washington,65 the United States 
Supreme Court held that, in order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, 
testimonial out-of-court statements are inadmissible unless the 
declarant has first been judged unavailable and the accused had a 
prior opportunity for cross examination.66 In Crawford, the Court 
deemed as testimonial a statement by a Mirandized witness given in a 
video-taped interrogation by police at the station after the crime was 
committed.67 
As a threshold matter, a trial court must determine if an out-of-
court statement is testimonial in nature.68 In past cases the Court has 
held that testimonial statements included testimony given “at a 
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, at a former trial; and 
[statements] to police during interrogations” as these are “modern 
practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed.”69 Besides these enumerated 
applications, the Court has yet to comprehensively define the scope of 
“testimonial” statements. 
In dicta in Crawford, the Court provided some guidance as to the 
logic behind the testimonial standard. The Court noted that the 
historical motivation for the Confrontation Clause stemmed from the 
common-law tradition of live-witness testimony at trial.70 This 
 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id.  
 63.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
 64.  Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1152 (2011).  
 65.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  
 66.  Id. at 68.  
 67.  Id. at 38, 68. 
 68.  See id. at 68. 
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Id. at 43 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373–374). 
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tradition is contrasted by the “examination in private by judicial 
officers” permitted under the civil law system.71 When such civil law, 
ex parte examinations were used in common-law courts in lieu of live 
testimony, the accused often demanded to have the declarant-
witnesses brought before him, in line with the traditions of the 
common law.72 
In their elaboration of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford, the 
Court recounted how the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh exemplified the 
kinds of “civil-law abuses” the Confrontation Clause was meant to 
prevent.73 There, Raleigh was convicted of treason based on the 
incriminating statements an alleged accomplice made out of court in 
an examination by the King’s Privy Council.74 The prosecution refused 
to hand over the witness to testify at trial.75 Part of the Court’s 
reasoning for overruling the reliability standard from Ohio v. Roberts 
was that the language of the Confrontation Clause, in line with the 
history of the common law, focuses on those witnesses bearing 
testimony against the accused.76 Testimony, the Court found, is not just 
any statement, but often “a solemn declaration or affirmation made 
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”77 Consequently, 
only a certain class of out-of-court statements was targeted by the 
Confrontation Clause.78 The Court held that statements taken by 
police during interrogations are testimonial, as are statements taken 
by other law-enforcement officers.79 
Case law has, however, chipped away at the circumstances in 
which statements to law enforcement are testimonial. In Davis v. 
Washington,80 the Supreme Court held that statements taken by law 
enforcement during an interrogation are non-testimonial when they 
are made “under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
 
 71.  Id.  
 72.  Id. (citing JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 326 (1883)). 
 73.  Id. at 51. 
 74.  Id. at 44. 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id. at 51. 
 77.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id. at 52–53 (“The involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial 
evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers are police or [not].”). 
 80.  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
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meet an ongoing emergency.”81 Conversely, when an objective 
observer would believe there is no ongoing emergency and the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is “to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecutions,” the 
statements are testimonial.82 Thus, the circumstances of the 
questioning, evaluated objectively, are important in determining 
whether the statements are testimonial.83 
The Court has applied this “primary-purpose test” on three 
occasions.84 In Davis, the Court applied the test to two sets of facts.85 
First, in the Davis facts, a caller to 911 dispatch informed the operator 
that she was physically assaulted by her former boyfriend who had 
entered her home in violation of a no-contact order and fled the scene 
during the call.86 While waiting for police to arrive, the dispatcher 
requested and acquired further identifying information from the 
caller about her assailant.87 The victim did not testify at the 
subsequent trial, but nevertheless the court admitted the 911 
recording in which she identified her former boyfriend.88 
On appeal, the Court determined that the statements made during 
the 911 call were non-testimonial.89 The Court explained that when an 
interrogation had the sole purpose of establishing facts that could be 
used as evidence to identify a suspect or pursue a conviction against 
him, statements made during that interrogation would be plainly 
testimonial.90 An initial interrogation during a 911 call, however, did 
not serve this purpose.91 Though the Court recognized that an 
interrogation to determine the need for emergency assistance could 
evolve into a testimonial conversation, the initial questioning of the 
caller in Davis was to enable police to respond to her ongoing 
emergency.92 In essence, “she was seeking aid, not telling a story about 
the past,” and police were seeking to “end a threatening situation.”93 
 
 81.  Id. at 822. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166 (2011).  
 84.  Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (deciding both Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005) 
and State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005)); Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143. 
 85.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 817, 819. 
 86.  Id. at 817–818. 
 87.  Id. at 818. 
 88.  Id. at 819.  
 89.  Id. at 828. 
 90.  Id. at 826. 
 91.  Id. at 827. 
 92.  Id. at 828–29. 
 93.  Id. at 831–32. 
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Second, in the facts of Hammon v. Indiana, police responded to 
reports of a domestic disturbance at the home of the declarant and 
her husband.94 With the couple separated a the scene, the police 
learned that the husband had battered his wife.95 They then had her 
fill out a battery affidavit.96 At the husband’s subsequent trial, the wife 
did not testify, but the prosecution had the responding officer repeat 
the wife’s statements and authenticate the affidavit.97 
The Court found that the wife’s statements to police were 
testimonial—and thus barred by the Confrontation Clause—because 
the officer’s primary purpose in taking the statement was to 
investigate a possible crime, not to address an ongoing emergency.98 In 
coming to this conclusion, the Court cited that the wife’s statement 
was given hours after the described events occurred.99 The Court 
further noted that, because the incident with her husband had ended 
before police showed up and she was separated from him, she faced 
no immediate threat to her person.100 In essence, the officer 
questioning the wife after the incident “was not seeking to determine 
(as in Davis) what is happening, but rather what [had] happened.”101 
Michigan v. Bryant102 further tested the testimonial bounds of 
victim statements to police officers. There, police responded to the 
scene of a shooting and found the victim dying from a gunshot 
wound.103 Police questioned the victim for five to ten minutes about 
who had shot him until emergency medical services arrived.104 The 
victim was able to identify his shooter before being transported to the 
hospital, where he later died.105 Police used the information from the 
victim to seek out the suspect at his home.106 At the shooter’s 
subsequent trial, police testified about what the victim had told them 
at the scene.107 
 
 94.  Id. at 819. 
 95.  Id. at 819–20. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 820.  
 98.  Id. at 830. 
 99.  Id. at 827.  
 100.  Id. at 829–30.  
 101.  Id. at 830 (citation omitted). 
 102.  Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 103.  Id. at 1150. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Id.  
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The Bryant Court found, given the circumstances surrounding the 
victim’s statements to the police, the primary purpose of their 
interrogation was to meet an ongoing emergency.108 Consequently, the 
statements were non-testimonial and admissible under the 
Confrontation Clause.109 The Court considered the circumstances of 
the interrogation in determining its primary purpose.110 These 
circumstances included the informal nature of the interrogation, given 
that it was disorganized and occurred in public, prior to the arrival of 
emergency medical services.111 As further evidence of the primary 
purpose, the Court also considered the statements and actions of both 
the police and the victim, including that the victim gave no indication 
that his emergency had passed and that police asked questions 
necessary to meet the threat.112 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Ohio’s Arguments 
Ohio first asserts that statements to non-law-enforcement officials 
without police involvement are non-testimonial under the 
Confrontation Clause.113 Ohio argues that statements between private 
parties are hardly ever given in the “witness” capacity contemplated 
by the Confrontation Clause because such statements are 
insufficiently formal and quite distinct from bearing testimony for an 
evidentiary purpose.114 Nor are they in line with the kinds of official 
abuses the Court believes the Confrontation Clause was crafted to 
address, namely “depositions or ex parte affidavits” used in lieu of live 
testimony.115 And in the case of private-party statements given by 
children too young to testify, child-declarants could never have given 
live-witness testimony in the first place.116 Therefore, their statements 
should be outside the Confrontation Clause’s ambit.117 Ohio posits 
 
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Id. at 1160. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 1166.  
 113.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 14. 
 114.  Id. at 18–19. 
 115.  Id. at 22, 24 (citation omitted). 
 116.  Id. at 31 (referencing OHIO R. OF EVID. 601(A), which states that children are too 
young to testify when they “appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and 
transactions respecting which they are examined”). 
 117.  Id.  
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that L.P.’s statements meet each of these requirements: (1) they were 
made between private parties; (2) were formal in neither location nor 
circumstance; and (3) were not intended to be a substitute for live 
witness testimony.118 
Petitioner notes that statements between private parties have 
historically raised only “evidentiary . . . not . . . constitutional” concerns, 
hence why they are primarily evaluated under a hearsay analysis.119 
This hearsay analysis has been trending toward admitting more 
private-party statements, a trend Ohio contends would not have been 
possible if the Confrontation Clause were meant to be rigidly applied 
to these statements.120 Furthermore, the hearsay analysis would 
regulate the use of these statements through various reliability tests121 
and the Due Process check would offer additional guarantees of 
reliability.122 Leaving non-testimonial statements for the realm of 
hearsay, Ohio believes, is “consistent with the Framers’ design to 
afford the states flexibility in their development of hearsay law” and 
would sufficiently protect criminal defendants from having unreliable 
out-of-court evidence offered against them.123 
Ohio secondly argues that its mandatory-reporting statute does 
not turn daycare teachers into police agents for the purpose of 
Confrontation Clause analysis.124 Historically, the common law 
differentiated between how the duty to report criminal activity 
applied to a “public officer,” in the sense of a government agent, 
versus a “common person.”125 Furthermore, the statute requires only 
that the individual report something that took place in the course of 
her normal job function.126 The statute does not require her to take on 
additional functions mirroring the role of police, such as investigating 
their suspicions.127 In reality, an individual can satisfy the statute 
 
 118.  Id. at 21, 25. 
 119.  Id. at 29. 
 120.  Id. at 28–29, 35. 
 121.  Id. at 35 (referencing OHIO R. EVID. 802, which states hearsay must fit into an 
exception for admission, and 807(A)(1), which states the need for hearsay to fit into a reliable 
categorical exception or a residual exception with “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness”).  
 122.  Id. at 36 (“Gross misuse of unreliable hearsay could violate the Due Process Clause if 
it is ‘so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice.’”) 
(quoting Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2012)). 
 123.  Id. at 35–36. 
 124.  Id. at 36. 
 125.  Id. at 38 (citation omitted). 
 126.  Id. at 39. 
 127.  Id. 
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without ever involving the criminal justice system.128 A reporter can 
choose to report suspicions to other public agents like social workers, 
who are not law enforcement, illustrating that the purpose of the 
statute is ultimately protective and not prosecutorial.129 Additionally, 
the declarant’s intent is also relevant to the testimonial analysis; 
deeming a statement testimonial based on a statute applicable only to 
the questioner ignores the role the declarant’s intent plays in the 
analysis.130 Ohio also points out that for the purposes of other 
constitutional rights, such as the Fifth Amendment, courts have 
rejected the argument that mandatory reporters are police agents.131 
Finally, Ohio argues that the circumstances and actions of the 
parties demonstrate that, under the primary-purpose test, L.P.’s 
statements are non-testimonial.132 From the teachers’ perspective, 
questioning a student about injuries would typically be for the 
protection of the student and not with an eye towards future 
prosecution of the abuser.133 Here, the teachers’ immediate response 
to L.P.’s injuries was to assess the situation, with the mandatory- 
reporting duty only an afterthought, mentioned later by their 
supervisor.134 No child in L.P.’s shoes (who was only three at the time) 
would have reasonably considered criminal proceedings as his 
purpose when answering his teachers’ questions.135 Finally, L.P.’s 
injuries demanded the teachers seek to mitigate any danger he faced, 
and asking who caused his injuries was a critical part of adequately 
responding to the emergency situation. Ohio posits that the informal 
nature of such emergency questioning goes toward the non-
testimonial nature of the statements. In short, the “totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis . . . shows that L.P. did not implicate Clark with 
the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony.”136 
 
 128.  Id. at 40. 
 129.  Id. at 39–40. 
 130.  Id. at 40 (“‘Statements made unwittingly to a government informant’ do not become 
testimonial merely because of the listener’s hidden prosecutorial motives.”) (quoting Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006)). 
 131.  Id. at 42–43 (discussing similarities in the Fourth and Sixth Amendment analyses).  
 132.  Id. at 51.  
 133.  Id. at 50–51.  
 134.  Id. at 52. 
 135.  Id. at 52–53. 
 136.  Id. at 55. 
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B.  Clark’s Arguments 
Clark first argues the primary-purpose test applies to all 
statements designed to aid criminal investigations, not just statements 
that adults make to law-enforcement officials.137 Clark notes that 
“police involvement has never been the touchstone of the 
Confrontation Clause.”138 A statement not taken by a law-
enforcement official can still implicate the very threat the 
Confrontation Clause is aimed at eradicating: ex parte statements 
functioning as the equivalent of live testimony.139 Clark asserts that 
children can make statements that function as substitutes for live 
testimony just as well as adults.140 Clark argues that the “investigative 
function” of the questioner is what really determines if a statement is 
testimonial, and both police and civilians have the power to 
investigate, even if civilian investigation occurs less frequently.141 
Clark next argues that under the primary-purpose test, the 
statement here is testimonial.142 Considering the circumstances 
objectively, he asserts that both L.P. and his teachers would have 
reasonably believed the primary purpose of their dialogue was to 
provide facts to investigate potentially criminal past behavior and, 
thus, L.P.’s statements were testimonial.143 Although the teachers’ 
ultimate goal in questioning L.P. may have been to protect him, the 
means by which that goal would be achieved—and not the goal 
itself—should be the focus of the primary-purpose inquiry.144 Here, 
they could protect L.P. by questioning him to establish facts about 
potentially criminal past behavior for the purposes of future 
prosecution.145 The mandatory-reporting statute in this case achieves 
its protective purpose by identifying abusers for prosecution, and the 
teachers here were trained specifically to investigate potential abuse 
to garner this information.146 Thus, from the teachers’ perspective, 
their primary purpose could not have been to protect L.P. in any 
ongoing emergency, given it was very unlikely he faced any harm in 
 
 137.  Brief for Respondent at ii, Ohio v. Clark, No. 13-1352 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2015) [hereinafter 
Brief for Respondent]. 
 138.  Id. at 29. 
 139.  Id. at 25–26 (citation omitted).  
 140.  Id. at 19. 
 141.  Id. at 30. 
 142.  Id. at 19. 
 143.  Id. at 34. 
 144.  Id. at 35. 
 145.  Id.  
 146.  Id. at 36. 
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the classroom or at school.147 
Considering L.P.’s perspective, Clark argues a child would 
reasonably have understood the purpose of the questioning was to 
elicit “a consequential accusation of wrongdoing.”148 In support of this 
assertion, Clark points to L.P.’s young age and the level of seriousness 
the boy would have associated with questioning from his teachers, 
who held an authoritative position in relation to him.149 Clark lastly 
analyzes the circumstances surrounding the teachers’ questioning, 
focusing on the implied formality of the situation as indicated by the 
formal student-teacher relationship, the duty to report under Ohio 
law, and the criminal and civil consequences of failing to report.150 
Clark claims this formality assessment is supported by the jury’s 
treatment of L.P.’s accusation as the equivalent of live testimony.151 
Clark finally argues that the history and development of hearsay 
law confirm that L.P.’s statements were testimonial. Child hearsay 
statements in lieu of live testimony were historically inadmissible 
when the child was deemed incompetent to testify.152 Clark asserts that 
states have in their power a readily available solution to the problem 
of child testimony by legally permitting children to testify in certain 
instances, such as in abuse cases, instead of deeming them 
incompetent due to their age.153 Clark believes this is a more viable 
option to prosecute child-abuse cases and one that would not 
undermine the adversarial system with the use of ex parte accusations 
during trial.154 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court will likely find L.P.’s statements to his 
teachers were non-testimonial and admissible under the 
Confrontation Clause.155 The primary-purpose test as expounded upon 
in Davis v. Washington and Michigan v. Bryant expressly applies only 
 
 147.  Id. at 38.  
 148.  Id. at 40. 
 149.  Id. at 39–40.  
 150.  Id. at 41–42. 
 151.  Id. at 42. 
 152.  Id. at 43, 48–49. 
 153.  Id. at 50 (referring to OHIO R. OF EVID. 601, under which the trial court deemed L.P. 
incompetent to testify because he was a child younger than ten).  
 154.  Id. at 57. 
 155.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 US. 36, 68 (2004) (holding testimonial out-of-court 
statements inadmissible when there was no prior opportunity for cross-examination of 
declarant).  
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to statements to law enforcement officials.156 Other courts have been 
loath to find that mandatory-reporting statutes transform recipients 
of information about child abuse into agents of law enforcement.157 
Without such a finding, the primary-purpose test is likely not 
applicable to these facts.158 Furthermore, the historical background of 
the Confrontation Clause, as understood by the Court, supports the 
argument that allowing statements such as L.P.’s at trial would not 
offend the Confrontation Clause.159 Regardless, as Ohio correctly 
notes, the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose 
of the dialogue between L.P. and his teachers was not to establish 
information for future prosecutorial use and, therefore, L.P.’s 
statements would be non-testimonial under the primary-purpose 
test.160 
A.  The Primary-Purpose Test is not Applicable to L.P.’s Statements. 
The simplest resolution to this case would be to find that the 
primary-purpose test was inapplicable because L.P.’s teachers were 
not law enforcement. The Ohio Supreme Court came to the opposite 
conclusion, determining Ohio’s mandatory-reporting statute 
transformed the teachers into law-enforcement agents and, 
consequently, the primary-purpose test applied to their questioning of 
L.P.161 Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.421 mandates that an 
individual 
acting in an official or professional capacity . . . [who] knows, or has 
reasonable cause to suspect based on facts that would cause a 
reasonable person in a similar position to suspect, that a child 
under eighteen years of age . . . has suffered or faces a threat of 
suffering any physical or mental wound, injury, disability, or 
 
 156.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (describing the primary-purpose test 
as applicable to statements to law enforcement); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 n.3 
(2011).  
 157.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 43; see, e.g., People v. Younghaz, 202 Cal. Rptr. 
907, 911 (Cal Ct. App. 1984); Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 528–29 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2005); State v. Sprouse, 478 S.E.2d 871, 874–76 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996); People v. Cavaiani, 432 
N.W.2d 409, 414 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).  
 158.  See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (stating that the primary-purpose test is applicable to 
statements made to law enforcement).  
 159.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (stating the Confrontation Clause applies only to 
statements bearing testimony via “a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact”).  
 160.  See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (holding when the primary purpose is to meet an ongoing 
emergency and not to establish facts for prosecutorial use, a statement is non-testimonial).  
 161.  See State v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592, 597 (Ohio 2013).  
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condition of a nature that reasonably indicates abuse or neglect of 
the child 
immediately report such suspicion or knowledge to the appropriate 
authority.162 The list of mandatory reporters is expansive and includes 
an “administrator or employee of a child day-care center” and a 
“school teacher” or “school employee.”163 The Ohio Supreme Court 
had previously found that the Ohio legislature enacted Section 
2151.421 with the main objective of protecting abused and neglected 
children, but that identifying and prosecuting the perpetrators was “a 
necessary and appropriate adjunct in providing such protection.”164 
The court used the prosecutorial purposes of the law to find that 
L.P.’s teachers were law-enforcement officials.165 The court was 
mistaken in inferring from the statute’s secondary concern with 
prosecuting abusers that the legislature intended to deputize every 
mandatory reporter.166 Considering the broad applicability of the 
statute, this interpretation would mean a substantial portion of the 
civilian population would be deputized as agents of law enforcement 
when reporting child abuse.167 Such a result would lead to child 
statements to reporters not being admissible in the subsequent trials 
of their abusers, which seems to squarely contradict what even the 
Ohio Supreme Court has recognized as the main objective of the 
statute: protecting children from abuse.168 
If L.P.’s teachers were not agents of law enforcement, the next 
issue is whether the primary-purpose test applies at all. If it does not, 
what other test applies?169 The Court has yet to decide whether or 
under what circumstances statements to non-law enforcement 
 
 162.  OHIO REV. COD. ANN. § 2151.421(A)(1)(a) (West 2015). 
 163.  Id. § 2151.421(A)(1)(b) (West 2015) (listing additionally as mandatory reporters 
attorneys, registered nurses, health care professionals, licensed psychologists, speech 
pathologists, coroners, social workers, humane society agents, and certain spiritual advisors).  
 164.  Yates v. Mansfield Board of Education, 808 N.E.2d 861, 865 (Ohio 2004).  
 165.  State v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d at 596–97 (“Prosecution for criminal acts of child abuse is 
expressly contemplated by the reporting statute . . . .”).  
 166.  See Yates, 808 N.E.2d at 865 (stating the primary objective of the statute is “to 
facilitate the protection of abused and neglected children rather than to punish those who 
maltreat them”).  
 167.  See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 38 (“If Ohio’s reporters are police agents, this 
traditional duty deputized the entire populace.”). 
 168.  See Yates, 808 N.E.2d at 865 (“[T]he primary purpose of reporting is to facilitate the 
protection of abused and neglected children. . . .”).  
 169.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (describing the primary-purpose test 
as applicable to statements made to law enforcement). 
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officials are testimonial.170 The Court could develop a new test 
applicable to statements to non-law enforcement.171 Such a test might 
rely on the lack of law enforcement involvement as a sign of a 
statement’s non-testimonial nature. For example, in Seely v. State, an 
Arkansas court held that a social worker was not an agent of law 
enforcement because the police did not “instigate, observe, or 
participate in” her questioning of the child, even though she may well 
have expected her questioning to be used as evidence in a subsequent 
prosecution.172 Or the test might, like the primary-purpose test, keep 
the focus on the objective purpose of the statement. For example, the 
dissent in Ohio v. Clark applied an objective-witness test, concluding 
L.P.’s statements were non-testimonial because “[n]o objective witness 
could reasonably believe that the interviews served a prosecutorial 
purpose rather than a protective one.”173 
Others argue this case is an opportunity for the Court to prevent 
the total evisceration of the right to confrontation by applying the 
Confrontation Clause analysis to all statements, not just those made 
to law enforcement. 174 For example, the authors of the Nesson Amicus 
Brief suggest a new test which considers whether a hearsay statement 
would be essential to a conviction to determine admissibility.175 Under 
this proposed test, statements which only corroborate other evidence 
would be admissible, but those which do more than just corroborate 
would not be admissible.176 Overhauling the imperfect 
testimonial/non-testimonial scheme the Court has spent so much time 
developing in favor of a test that would also require extensive 
guesswork by a court, however, does not make the right to 
confrontation any more guaranteed. And adopting a wholly new test 
would be an ambitious undertaking by the Court given the radical 
overhaul Confrontation Clause analysis already received in 
Crawford.177 
 
 170.  Id. at 823 n.2; Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 n.3 (2011). 
 171.  See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of United States at 13, Ohio v. Clark, No. 13-1352 (U.S. 
Nov. 24, 2014) (proposing a categorical exclusion of statements to civilians as non-testimonial). 
 172.  Seely v. State, 282 S.W.3d 778, 787, 788–90 (Ark. 2008).  
 173.  State v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592, 601 (Ohio 2013).  
 174.  See Brief Amicus Curiae of Fern L. Nesson and Charles R. Nesson at 2, Ohio v. Clark, 
No. 13-1352 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2014).  
 175.  Id. at 5. 
 176.  Id. at 3–4. 
 177.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (overruling the standard from Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)). 
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B.  Statements Such as L.P.’s are not Within the Confrontation 
Clause’s Intended Ambit. 
Furthermore, the historical context of the Confrontation Clause 
indicates that admitting statements such as L.P.’s would not offend the 
Confrontation Clause because it was never meant to exclude such 
statements.178 Admittedly, and contrary to Ohio’s argument, the 
admission of statements by a declarant who is legally incapable of 
testifying does seem problematic in light of the common-law tradition 
of live-witness testimony.179 After all, it could provide a backdoor for 
statements which otherwise would not be admissible at trial. L.P.’s 
statements, however, do not implicate a key concern of Confrontation 
Clause analysis in that his statements are not the kind of ex parte 
examination in which a declarant is bearing testimony against the 
accused.180 This was ultimately the concern that led the Crawford 
court to distinguish between testimonial and non-testimonial 
statements.181 
As the Court suggested in Crawford, statements made to law 
enforcement are more akin to bearing testimony than other 
statements.182 When speaking to the police formally, such as in the 
video-taped interrogation in Crawford, no reasonable person involved 
would doubt that the statements could be used against the accused at 
trial.183 The testimonial nature of these statements is relatively clear. 
L.P.’s statements were informally made to teachers without any 
direction or involvement by law enforcement. Nothing about 
statements like L.P.’s suggests the kinds of “civil law abuses” where 
“testimony” for trial is collected by a means other than having the 
witness testify at trial.184 In fact, these abuses would rarely, if ever, be a 
risk in communications solely between private parties, where 
prosecutorial aims seem objectively unlikely. 
 
 
 178.  See id. at 51 (finding that the Confrontation Clause applies only to a certain class of 
statements).  
 179.  See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 31; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (discussing 
the common law tradition of live witness testimony).  
 180.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (examining the kinds of statements contemplated by the 
Confrontation Clause).  
 181.  See id. at 60 (overruling the Roberts standard because it violated the historical 
principles embodied in the Confrontation Clause).  
 182.  Id. at 68.  
 183.  See id. at 38, 68 (finding this video-taped interrogation to be testimonial).  
 184.  See id. at 50.  
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C.  The Totality of the Circumstances Demonstrates L.P.’s Statements 
Would Satisfy the Primary-Purpose Test as Non-Testimonial. 
Even if the court did find L.P.’s teachers were agents of law 
enforcement, under the primary-purpose test, his statements are not 
testimonial. The circumstances fail to indicate that either L.P. or his 
teachers would have reasonably believed that the primary purpose of 
their dialogue was to provide facts for the criminal prosecution of 
L.P.’s abuser.185 The informality of the questioning and the immediacy 
of the threat to L.P.’s safety support that his statements were made as 
part of an ongoing emergency and were, therefore, non-testimonial.186 
The circumstances of the questioning were informal: L.P.’s teacher 
first noticed his injuries at lunch and asked casually what had 
happened.187 Though she continued her questioning, this was only 
after seeing how severe his injuries really were back in the 
classroom.188 If anything, her persistent questioning demonstrates the 
panic provoked by the severity of L.P.’s injuries. Despite the 
positional authority the teachers held in relation to L.P., authority 
does not formality make.189 While L.P. was pulled aside to be 
questioned, nothing about the initial interrogation, which took place 
in the lunchroom and a classroom, was private.190 Perhaps a different 
case could be made for his secondary identification of Dee when 
taken to the supervisor’s office,191 but even there, neither police nor 
social services had been alerted.192 
Furthermore, the questioning took place to assess and address the 
threat L.P. was facing.193 The teachers’ line of questioning indicates 
 
 185.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (holding that when the primary 
purpose of an interrogation is to prove facts for later prosecution, the statement is testimonial).  
 186.  See id. (finding statements to police during an ongoing emergency are non-testimonial 
under the Confrontation Clause). 
 187.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 22; see Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 
(2011) (considering the informality of the interrogation as evidence statement was non-
testimonial).  
 188.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 3–4.  
 189.  See Brief of Respondent, supra note 137, at 39–40 (arguing L.P. would have known his 
statements were for prosecuting wrongdoing given his teachers’ authoritative position).  
 190.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 3.  
 191.  Id. at 4; see Davis, 547 U.S. at 828–829 (stating an initial interrogation assessing an 
emergency could evolve into testimonial dialogue).  
 192.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 4; see Bryant 131 S. Ct. at 1160 (considering 
emergency medical services not being on the scene yet as indicative of the primary purpose of 
the questioning being to address an ongoing emergency). 
 193.  See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828–29 (finding a statement not testimonial when the purpose of 
the questioning was to enable police to respond to a declarant’s ongoing emergency).  
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their desire to identify the threat to L.P.’s safety, asking, for example, 
whether Dee was “big or little.”194 Underlying many of Clark’s 
arguments is the suggestion that identifying the perpetrator of a crime 
is always equivalent to bearing testimony against that person and, 
therefore, testimonial, a sentiment also adopted by the Ohio Supreme 
Court.195 The case law, however, simply does not support this 
contention. Both Davis v. Washington and Michigan v. Bryant found 
identification of a perpetrator to be non-testimonial because of the 
ongoing emergency that needed to be addressed.196 Unlike the police 
officers in Hammon v. Indiana, the teachers were not trying to make a 
record of what happened to L.P. for future criminal prosecution.197 
Questioning L.P. about his injuries was necessary to assess and 
address the threat he faced. 
Being only three years old, L.P. could not have reasonably 
considered Dee’s prosecution when he answered his teachers’ 
questions.198 First, it is wholly unlikely he would have even known at 
such a young age what a criminal prosecution was. And, as indicated 
by his initial reluctance to tell his teachers and the social worker at 
school what had happened to him, he was afraid.199 A fearful toddler 
could hardly be interpreted as bearing testimony for prosecutorial 
purposes.200 L.P.’s abuse was undoubtedly an emergency situation and, 
like the 911 caller in Davis, L.P.’s emergency continued even though 
the perpetrator was not on the scene at that moment.201 Although L.P. 
gave information about past abuse, he did so while the threat of 
future abuse was all too present. L.P. may have been safe at school, 
but he likely understood that his own safety would vanish once he was 
handed back over to his abuser at the end of the school day. He likely 
 
 194.  See id; Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 4.  
 195.  See Brief of Respondent, supra note 137, at 37–38; State v. Clark, 999 N.E. 2d 592, 597 
(Ohio 2013). 
 196.  Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150 (identification of a shooter at a crime scene is non-
testimonial); Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (identification of an assailant in a 911 call is non-
testimonial). 
 197.  See Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (finding the primary purpose of officers having a victim fill 
out a battery affidavit was to investigate a possible crime and not address an ongoing 
emergency). 
 198.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 2; see Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1166 (considering the 
circumstances, statements, and actions of both parties in determining the primary purpose).  
 199.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 3, 4. 
 200.  See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (finding a statement is testimonial when made primarily for 
prosecutorial purposes).  
 201.  See id. at 828–29 (finding a statement to enable police to respond to a caller’s 
emergency situation non-testimonial although the perpetrator had fled the scene).  
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thought his teachers could have protected him from this threat, yet 
seeking protection is not the same as seeking to prosecute. The 
existence of an ongoing emergency is also supported by the fact that 
when Dee picked L.P. up from school later that day, both police and 
social workers were on the move to locate not only Dee, but the  
children as well.202 All circumstances suggest L.P.’s teachers were 
trying to assess and address an ongoing emergency and not gather 
information to be used in lieu of live witness testimony at trial. 
Therefore, L.P.’s statements should be deemed non-testimonial for the 
purpose of Confrontation Clause analysis.203 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Ohio Supreme Court will likely be overturned. 
L.P.’s statements to his daycare teachers identifying his abuser are 
non-testimonial under the primary-purpose test promulgated in Davis 
v. Washington.204 It is almost certain that this test without further 
guidance from the Court, however, applies only to statements to law-
enforcement officials.205 Statements solely between private parties do 
not implicate the kinds of ex parte examinations the Supreme Court 
deemed to be the focus of the Confrontation Clause at its inception.206 
Interpreting mandatory-reporting statutes as deputizing reporters as 
agents of law enforcement not only does not fit into the 
Confrontation Clause’s historical scheme but also threatens to 
severely inhibit a state’s interest in protecting children from abuse. 
For these reasons, the Supreme Court will likely decide that L.P.’s 
statements to his teachers were non-testimonial under the 
Confrontation Clause and admissible against his abuser at trial. 
 
 
 202.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 5; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150, 1166 (finding a 
statement non-testimonial even when police relied upon it to search for a shooter).  
 203.  See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (finding a statement non-testimonial when made to address 
an ongoing emergency).  
 204.  See id. at 822.  
 205.  See id. (describing the primary-purpose test as applicable to statements to law 
enforcement). 
 206.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (examining the kinds of statements 
contemplated by the Confrontation Clause). 
